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I 
 To begin with, a remark about the second question: I think it would be foolish 
of me to try to give a decisive answer, because all one has to start from is what Plato did 
write down. This paper is in any case not primarily about Plato; yet I find what he has 
written--or may have written--in many ways very suggestive. Let me remind you what 
he wrote--or may have written--about the writing of philosophy. 
 The source whose authenticity I assume to be without serious challenge is the 
Phaedrus. There Socrates tells Phaedrus that he has heard, but cannot vouch for its truth, 
that it was the Egyptian god Thoth (He*t|) who invented--note the colloca-
tion--numbers and reckoning and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, 
and notably writing; that Thoth maintained that in writing he had discovered “an elixir 
of wisdom and of memory”; but that the king of the country, Halo’|, the god whom the 
Greeks call -llom, rejected this contention, saying that writing is merely an elixir of 
reminding, not of memory, and that it would produce only the reputation, not the truth, 
of wisdom. Socrates then himself takes up the interpretation of the judgment of 
Halo’|/-llom. He blames the written word primarily for its unresponsiveness: its in-
ability to reply to questioning; its insistence upon saying continually the same thing, 
with no regard for its audience. In an agricultural comparison, he likens writing to the 
planting of seeds for purely ornamental purposes, in conditions not suitable for the 
proper growth and ripening of fruit; and concludes that one who has knowledge of 
some things (in particular, of the just and the beautiful and the good) “will not then 
write them, in earnest, in black fluid, sowing by means of a pen with arguments that 
cannot defend themselves by argument.” Such a person will rather, he says, “sow gar-
dens with letters for the sake of amusement; and will write, when he does so, to 
treasure up reminders for himself when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and 
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for others who follow the same path; and will delight in seeing the plants putting forth 
tender leaves. When others use other amusements, refreshing themselves with drinking 
parties and the like, he will, it seems, instead of these, pass the time playing at those I 
speak of.” And the conclusion of all this is that whoever does appreciate the limited 
worth of writing, and is able both to support his own writings in discussion and to 
show their defects, deserves the title, not of “wise”—rouæ|—but of a lover of 
wisdom—uikærouo|. 
 So writing ranks in one sense with draughts and dice rather than with number, 
reckoning, geometry, and astronomy. But its dismissal is not by any means so drastic as, 
say, the expulsion of the poets in the Republic: as an amusement, it is in fact praised. 
More than this, there is a pregnant irony in Plato’s remarks. For Socrates, who is repre-
sented as engaged in live discussion with Phaedros, speaks, at the end, of that discus-
sion itself as an entertainment or pastime. And in the Laws, that very long and sober 
discourse which the Athenian Stranger characterizes (685a)  as “an old man’s sober 
playing of a game of laws,” we also read (803c-d) that human beings are playthings of 
the deity, that accordingly every man and woman ought to spend life playing at the 
finest games, that in particular people err in regarding warfare as serious work: rather, the 
most serious things for us are paid¨a—play—and paide¨a—education, when they are 
genuine and worthy of the name. 
 So much, then, for Plato’s play with this point; but there is another passage that 
bears upon the question of the written word that seems to me very illuminat-
ing--although here the authenticity of the work is open to question. I think it may be al-
lowed into the discussion, even if only in the spirit in which Socrates let in the story 
about Thoth. I have in mind the seventh of the reputed letters of Plato. There he (or 
whoever it may be, in his name) explains why there does not and will not exist any trea-
tise of his on what he seriously pursues. The explanation takes the form of a roughly 
sketched semantical theory. There are, one reads, of anything that is, three requisites for 
knowledge; five things in all, then, counting the knowledge itself and its object--what is 
truly known. First there is a word, or name, or noun (√mola)—for instance, ‘circle’; sec-
ond a formula or definition (kæco|), composed of nouns and verbs--in the case at hand, 
“that in which the distance from extremity to center is everywhere equal” would be the 
kæco| of that whose name is rotund and round and circle; third is the image 
(>eidxkom)—here what is drawn and erased and turned on the lathe and destroyed. 
But none of these >eidxka is the circle that is the object of knowledge (a point that 
hardly needs to be amplified, whether on Plato’s behalf or on that of mathematics itself). 
Between these first three and the veritable object of knowledge the writer inserts the 
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fourth, which he now describes as “knowledge ($epirsñlg) and intellectual grasp 
(mo’|) and true opinion (2kghó| dæna) concerning these things--which have to be 
posited as one further thing, existing not in sounds or shapes of bodies but in minds [or 
souls—$em  wtva¥|].” Thus the view is expressed that the whole apparatus of what 
we might call “object-semantics,” involving both linguistic signs and ordinary things 
(Plato’s “images”), cannot suffice to determine meaning and truth, without some essen-
tial involvement of the language users and their conceptions and beliefs; and the writer 
goes on to assert that this determination can occur reliably only in discussion, with 
questioning and answering “free from envy”--and that, indeed, over a long time: a 
process which, in favorable conditions, can lead to a shining forth of the light of 
understanding and intelligence (uqæmgri| and mo’|). (One further point deserves to 
be mentioned: the writer remarks that names have no fixed connection to objects, and 
therefore by their use alone obscurity cannot be avoided; nor can it be so by kæcoi, 
since these are made up of nouns and verbs. I believe that Plato would have been 
unimpressed by the causal theory of reference and the postulate of rigid designators; I 
wish we had the Socratic dialogue on this subject.) 
 II 
 Having begun with a digression, I continue with another, shorter one: I want to cite 
three sayings of a man who may be regarded as an unlikely one to invoke when the 
subject is science and its bearing on our view of the real. I mean William Blake--who 
would probably not listen with any patience to what I have to say, but who nevertheless 
seems to me sometimes to strike just the right note. The sayings are these: 
 (1) If others had not been foolish, we should be so. 
 (2) Reason or the ratio of all we have already known, is not the same that it shall be 
when we know more. 
These two statements have an obvious affinity; the second of them--I think the first 
also--bears on the notion of philosophy as concerned with the establishment of 
“conceptual necessities.” The third passage concerns skepticism; it reads: 
 (3)    If the Sun & Moon should doubt 
     Theyd immediately Go out. 
 There is of course more than one kind of doubt. In so far as Blake means to include 
the doubt practiced by Socrates in his dismissal, I do not agree. 
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III 
 Now to physics and metaphysics. Aristotle--who of course did not use the noun 
‘metaphysics’--offers us (at least) three formulas: “the science”--or is it a science?--“of 
being as such” (not perhaps very illuminating); or “of first principles and causes”; or “of 
the substance with the highest kind of actuality”--in which connection he also calls it 
“theology.” But one must be careful to try to understand what Aristotle means by this. 
The substance in question, eternal and unchanging, unmoving, because it is entirely 
“actual” and in no way “potential,” Aristotle associates with the heavens and their 
(allegedly) unchanging regular motions. It is not the substance of the heavens--the sub-
stance of the heavens is a kind of body; and although its motions are stable, they are yet 
motions. The divine substance is, rather, the constantly actual, never changing, cause  of 
the regular motions of the heavenly bodies. Thus what Aristotle calls “theology” may 
be seen as his version--a little remote, to be sure--of what we should rather call 
“astrophysics.” He even tells us that, since first philosophy is to deal with the most fun-
damental causes, if there were no such substance, “separated” from matter, from po-
tentiality, and therefore unchanging, as, he argues, there is, then natural sci-
ence--physics--would be the primary and highest philosophy. 
 Before I put a Q.E.D., claiming to have proved out of the mouth of its first author 
that, in view of modern ideas about the world, physics is not merely relevant to, but is 
what used to be called “metaphysics,” I shall indulge in yet another pair of quotations; 
this time from a (fairly) modern physicist with a mind charged with Socratic skepticism 
and a wonderful prose style. In volume 19 of Nature, James Clerk Maxwell reviewed a 
somewhat whimsical book called Paradoxical Philosophy. At one point in his review, 
Maxwell cites the opinion on the relation of matter to thought of the biologist Karl 
Wilhelm von Nägeli, expressed in an article in Nature two volumes previously, that is 
related to a position discussed in the book: 
 He [von Nägeli] can draw no line across the great chain of being, and say 
that sensation and consciousness do not extend below that line. He cannot 
doubt that every molecule possesses something related, though distantly, to 
sensation, “since each one feels the presence, the particular condition, the pe-
culiar forces of the other, and, accordingly, has the inclination to move, and 
under certain circumstances really begins to move--becomes alive as it 
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were;”1 . . . “If, therefore, the molecules feel something which is related to 
sensation, then this must be pleasure if they can respond to attraction and re-
pulsion, i.e. follow their inclination or disinclination; it must be displeasure if 
they are forced to execute some opposite movement, and it must be neither 
pleasure nor displeasure if they remain at rest.” 
And Maxwell’s comment: 
  Professor von Nägeli must have forgotten his dynamics, or he would 
have remembered that the molecules, like the planets, move along like 
blessed gods. They cannot be disturbed from the path of their choice by the 
action of any forces, for they have a constant and perpetual will to render to 
every force precisely that amount of deflexion which is due to it. Their con-
dition must, therefore, be one of unmixed and unbroken pleasure. 
 A similar point is made in his review (Nature, vol. 20) of the second volume of an 
important work by two good friends of his--Elements of Natural Philosophy, by Thomson 
(i.e., Lord Kelvin that was to be) and Tait.  “The capacity of the student,” Maxwell says, 
“is called upon to accept the following statement” (one that in fact was quite stan-
dard--a close paraphrase of Newton):--“Matter has an innate power of resisting external 
influences, so that every body, as far as it can, remains at rest or moves uniformly in a 
straight line.” Referring to this as a “Manichaean doctrine of the innate depravity of 
matter,” he asks: 
 Is it a fact that “matter” has any power, either innate or acquired, of 
resisting external influences? Does not every force which acts on a body 
always produce exactly that change in the motion of the body by which its 
value, as a force, is reckoned? Is a cup of tea to be accused of having an 
innate power of resisting the sweetening influence of sugar, because it 
persistently refuses to turn sweet unless the sugar is actually put into it? 
  A question that these passages point to is this: What has been meant--and what role 
has been played--in the succession of doctrines of physics we have had since the seven-
teenth century, by notions (not necessarily technical) of “power” and of “cause”? 
                                                 
1Of this view, that “all matter is, in some occult sense, alive” (expressed in 
Paradoxical Philosophy by one Dr. Hermann Stoffkraft), Maxwell had said just before: 
“This is what we may call the ‘levelling up’ policy.” 
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IV 
 To approach this question, let me turn first to a thinker who is one of my favorites 
for instructive foolishness: Descartes; but not to one of his truly spectacular pieces of 
foolishness, rather to a bit of not entirely implausible analysis of “conceptual necessity” 
that ought to help indicate the serious pitfalls of such proceedings. Descartes, of course, 
held--as a point of conceptual necessity--that the essential attribute of body is just to be 
extended. This poses rather serious problems for the understanding--the conceptual 
analysis--of motion; but Descartes did not feel the difficulty, and for the present 
discussion I waive the point: let us merely note that Descartes took it for granted that it 
makes sense to speak of “parts of the extended” as changing their positions relative to one 
another. He also took it for granted that these “parts of the extended” are impenetrable to 
one another; and so was led to the view that it is clearly and distinctly intelligible that if 
moving bodies meet, the motion of one or both must change. This, he claimed, is not 
only an intelligible mode of interaction of bodies, but is the only intelligible mode of 
their interaction; and he concluded that he had identified the “absolute” principle of 
“natural powers in general”--that is, had characterized, for the material realm, just what 
are the “first principles and causes.” 
 This view of causation was shared by a large number of seventeenth-century natu-
ral philosophers--it formed an essential part of the “new,” or “mechanical,” philosophy. 
Among the proponents of this philosophy, an important group rejected Descartes’s 
identification of matter with the extended, and rejected its corollary that the world is a 
plenum, holding rather with the ancient atomists that matter comes in the form of dis-
crete and indivisible fundamental particles, separated by void space. (It is this 
“corpuscularian Hypothesis” that was favored by Locke--as, he tells us, “that which is 
thought to go farthest in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of bodies”.2 [I WAS 
RATHER ASTONISHED AT A COLLOQUIUM TALK NOT LONG AGO TO HEAR LOCKE’S 
ACCOUNT OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES CALLED A CASE OF “PHYSICS ENVY.” 
HERE IS LOCKE ON PHYSICS: “I AM APT TO DOUBT THAT, HOW FAR SOEVER HUMANE 
                                                 
2But it is, for him, only a hypothesis. He adds, “and I fear the Weakness of humane 
Understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and 
clearer discovery of the necessary Connexion, and Coexistence, of the Powers, which are 
to be discovered united in several sorts of them [i.e., bodies]. This at least is true, that 
which ever Hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to 
determine,) [etc.]” (An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, ch. iii, §16;  
emphasis added).  
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INDUSTRY MAY ADVANCE USEFUL AND EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN PHYSICAL THINGS, 
SCIENTIFICAL WILL STILL BE OUT OF OUR REACH”; AND WHY?--“BECAUSE WE WANT 
PERFECT AND ADEQUATE IDEAS OF THOSE VERY BODIES, WHICH ARE NEAREST TO US, AND 
MOST UNDER OUR COMMAND” (ESSAY, III, III, §26). IT IS, IN FACT, THE THEORY OF THE 
“IDEAS”  OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES THAT DETERMINED LOCKE’S SKEPTICISM 
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SCIENTIFIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. THAT SKEPTICISM WAS LATER 
AMELIORATED BY WHAT LOCKE LEARNED FROM NEWTON--OF THIS THERE IS HARDLY A 
TRACE IN THE ESSAY--BUT THAT WAS PRECISELY THROUGH AN ADVANCE THAT VIOLATED 
THE PRINCIPLE OF LOCKE’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN IDEAS OF PRIMARY AND OF SECONDARY 
QUALITIES.]) On the corpuscularian view--since all the “new” philosophers, Cartesian or 
corpuscularian, held that a body in motion will of itself continue to move uniformly in a 
straight line--the processes of nature are governed by the collisions of bodies; and thus 
one could say that in this philosophy “causal efficacy” consists precisely in what Locke 
called impulse; that is, the power by which the motions of bodies are changed when they collide.3 
It is worth noting that this theory makes acts of causation in the process of nature 
discrete occurrences; and if one describes as the “effect” of a collision the consequent 
motions of the colliding bodies (rather than their changes of motion), it places the effects, 
in time, after the causes. That, I believe, has continued to be the dominant view among 
philosophers--reinforced, for instance, both by Hume’s analysis of causation and by that 
of Kant (in the Second Analogy). 
 The mechanical philosophy was a failure. The only class of natural phenomena to 
which it can be applied with reasonable success is that of the behavior of gases at low 
pressure. 
V 
 I turn next to the Newtonian conception of the fundamental constitution of the 
world. That label demands two qualifications, of which I state the first here, and reserve 
the second for later. One of the most basic features of Newton’s own account is his con-
ception of space and its relation to time and to bodies. He tells us near the beginning of 
the Principia that the aim of that work is to show “how we are to collect the true 
                                                 
3With his characteristic ability to see all sides of a question--but without sorting 
them out clearly--Locke first describes “impulse” as “the only way which we can 
conceive Bodies operate in” (Essay, II, viii, §11); but later says, quite emphatically, that 
we no more understand how motion is communicated from body to body by impulse 
than how motion is excited in a body by a mind; of these, he says, “we are equally in the 
dark” (ibid., II, xxiii, §28). 
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motions [that is: motions in absolute space] from their causes, effects, and apparent 
differences; and vice versa, how from the motions, either true or apparent, we may come 
to the knowledge of their causes and effects.” The account I shall give makes use of 
more modern mathematical conceptions that allow one to formulate the Newtonian 
physical principles without postulating absolute space. The theater of natural processes 
is instead taken to be a four-dimensional manifold W, with the following properties: 
[DRAW DIAGRAM] 
 (1) W possesses what is called an affine geometric structure: there is an associated 
four-dimensional real vector-space V [THIS IS ITSELF A QUITE ELEMENTARY 
ALGEBRAIC NOTION] that acts as a “simply transitive  transformation-group” on 
W--this means that (a) for every point p of W and vector v of V there is a unique 
point q of W that is the point reached from p by applying the vector v; and (b) for ev-
ery pair of points p, q, of W there is a unique vector v of V that, applied to p, 
reaches q. 
 (2) There is a distinguished linear mapping of V onto a one-dimensional real vector-
space, the space of durations or time-intervals; thus for any pair of points p, q, of W 
one can speak of “the time-interval from p to q”--namely, the duration of the vec-
tor that goes from p to q. It follows that there is a distinguished three-dimen-
sional subspace of V that comprises the vectors of duration zero; these, as having 
(one may say) a vanishing time-component, are called spatial vectors. The relation 
“the vector from p to q is spatial” is then--as is easy to check--an equivalence-rela-
tion on W; its equivalence-classes give us a decomposition of W into three-di-
mensional subspaces of what one will then call simultaneous points; and we shall 
also speak of each of these equivalence-classes as a moment of time. (It is impor-
tant to notice that if p and q belong to one moment of time, and if p’ and q’ belong 
to another, the time-intervals from p to q and from p’ to q’ are equal; thus we 
may speak of the time-interval from one moment to another.) 
 (3) On the set of spatial vectors there is a Euclidean metric structure, allowing us to 
speak of the “length” of any spatial vector and the “angle” between any two 
such vectors [AGAIN IT IS EASY TO CHARACTERIZE THIS NOTION IN PURELY 
ALGEBRAIC TERMS]. We may therefore speak of the “spatial distance” between a 
pair of points p, q, of W provided they are simultaneous; but only under this 
condition. 
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 That is the theater; the actors are bodies. These are conceived, first of all, as systems 
of “material points”; and it is postulated that each material point has associated with it a 
unique line of the manifold W, and one that has exactly one point in common with each 
moment of time: that is, each material point has a “location” in W at--or in--each mo-
ment, and these locations constitute a continuous curve, the world-line of the material 
point. Further conditions upon the “realm of body (or matter)” and its relation to the 
theater of space-time (that is, the manifold W) can involve one in somewhat intricate is-
sues, and mathematical subtleties, if one wishes to accommodate all the possibilities of a 
theory of matter as a continuous medium. In any event, there must be a distinguished 
class of sets of material points that can reasonably be called bodies; and over this set there 
must be a measure, called by Newton the “quantity of matter,” or mass. Newton’s own 
view--although never asserted by him as more than “probable”--agrees here with the 
corpuscularians: He thinks that what I have called the “realm of body” is the disjoint 
union of sets of material points that may be called “corpuscles” or “particles,” on each 
of which separately a metric structure is determined (so that one may speak of the 
“distance” between two points of any one particle)--a metric under which each particle 
is congruent to a set of quite simple structure in Euclidean three-dimensional space 
(say, to the closure of a bounded, connected, open set); and that in particular each 
particle is congruent, in this sense, to the set of space-time points occupied by it at any 
moment. What this means in simpler terms is that each particle is a rigid unbreakable 
body--an atom, in  the classical sense of the word. Newton further assumes that the 
atoms are impenetrable--that no point of space-time can be occupied by interior points 
of two different particles. 
 Given the theater and the actors, what is the script? Here the contribution enters of 
the great discovery that Newton made in the summer and fall of 1684, after Halley vis-
ited him at Cambridge and posed the question of what the path would be of a body 
moving under the influence of a force that varies inversely as the square of the distance 
from a fixed point. Newton already knew the answer; but the question set him thinking 
further, and what he arrived at was simultaneously what he called an “a priori proof of 
the Copernican system” (this explains his statement that the aim of his treatise was to 
show how to determine the true motions, etc.); an utterly unprecedented universal law 
of nature--that of universal gravitation; and a new set of metaphysical principles--of first 
principles and causes. These really did emerge simultaneously, the several constituents 
supporting one another like the stones of an arch; but here, more cut-and-dried-ly, is the 
result:-- 
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 According to Newton, of first principles and causes in nature--of what he calls 
“natural powers” (cf. Descartes), or “forces of nature”--there are two large classes: the 
intrinsic force of bodies, which he also calls their force of inactivity (vis inertiæ), and the ac-
tive forces. Each force--active or inert (Newton also says “passive”)--is characterized by a 
law of nature of a suitable form. The law that characterizes an active power has to spec-
ify, for any given pair of bodies in any given situation, a pair of vectors called the motive 
forces impressed, in that situation, by each body upon the other (the “active” laws are, 
thus, laws of interaction). The law that characterizes the vis inertiæ is the conjunction of 
Newton’s three Laws of Motion: it says in effect (since the first Law of Motion is super-
fluous) that (a) the rate of change of the quantity of motion of a body at any given mo-
ment is proportional--equal, if units are properly chosen--to the net, the vector sum, of 
all the motive forces impressed upon it at that moment; and (b) the motive forces im-
pressed upon each other by any pair of bodies at any moment are equal and opposite 
(one may want to add: and directed along the line joining the two bodies).4 
 That laws of interaction of this type fit within the architecture of the “theater” I 
have described can be seen as follows. In the first place, the laws of active force must 
express the impressed motive forces at any moment as functions of the situation of the 
bodies at that moment. To describe this situation, we have available all the normal resources 
of geometry: for all the relations of Euclidean geometry are defined for simultaneous 
space-time points.5 The vectors that represent the motive forces are spatial ones, 
“directed along the line joining the two bodies” at the given time--a well-defined 
notion. The most pressing question that arises is how to understand the phrase “rate of 
change of the quantity of motion.” The quantity of motion--momentum, as we now 
say--of a body is defined by Newton (and in ordinary textbooks) as the product of the 
mass of the body and its velocity. But in space-time as I have presented it, there is no 
concept of (absolute) velocity: since there is no defined “spatial distance” between two 
points at different moments, one cannot speak of the distance a body has traversed over 
an interval of time. This circumstance is the fundamental reason why Newton felt 
himself compelled to base his discussion on a notion of space as persisting through time 
(with a structure independent of the bodies that are located in it). The structure of W, 
however, allows us to associate with each material point at each moment a vector of the 
                                                 
4Note that clause (b)--the third Law of Motion--is in effect a condition placed upon 
the form of the laws of the active forces. 
5I have used the somewhat imprecise word “situation”; one might, however, need 
to take into account the relative velocities of the bodies at a moment. This can be done, in 
light of the circumstance about to be explained. 
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four-dimensional vector-space V--provided the world-line of that point is “smooth” at 
that moment: namely, the unit tangent-vector to that world-line--i.e., the tangent-vector, 
“pointing forwards” in time, of unit duration.6     Such vectors do not represent 
velocities; but the difference of two such vectors precisely corresponds to what, in the 
“absolute” theory, would be the difference of two velocities; and this whether the two 
vectors represent the states of motion of one particle at different moments, or of two 
particles (at the same or different moments). Therefore one has the result, at first 
appearance paradoxical (although--as I have explained on two occasions rather long 
ago--Christiaan Huygens seems most remarkably to have anticipated it), that it is 
possible in the indicated structure--and thus, according to the theory it belongs to, in the 
world--to define “velocity difference,” despite the absence of any conception of 
“velocity.” Analogously, we are able to define the rate of change of the quantity of 
motion: in place of the quantity-of-motion vector of Newton, which should be space-like, 
we have the “time-like” quantity of motion, the product of a body’s mass by the unit 
tangent-vector to its world-line. (I here treat the body--that is, the particle--as if it were 
itself a single material point. This can be avoided; but the complications involved are a 
bit too much to consider for present purposes.) 
 There is another way to look at the Newtonian active natural powers--one that in 
fact played a critical role in his own discovery of the power of gravitation. Although it 
has not been stipulated in the rather general characterization I have given, it is rather 
natural to suppose that a law of interaction of pairs of particles should make the forces 
any two given particles impress on one another depend, not on the “situation,” as I 
have called it, of all particles at a given moment, but just on the geometrical relationship 
of the two particles concerned. Then when we consider either of the two--let us call it 
A--as the exerciser of action upon the other, we may ask, of any second particle B subject 
to the natural power in question, what force would be exerted upon it by A at any given 
place (relative to A). Newton indicates--although in a fashion somewhat special to the 
case of gravitation with which he is dealing--that when A is regarded in this way as a 
“source” of the exercise of a given force of nature, one should think of the law of that 
force as specifying “as it were a certain efficacy diffused from the center to all places 
round about, to move the bodies that are in them”; in other words, the law associated 
with a force of nature specifies, for each body A that exercises that force, what we now 
call a field of force surrounding A. The principle of interaction implies, of course, that the 
                                                 
6I here take it for granted that the tangent-vector is not spatial--which would 
correspond to an infinite velocity at the moment in question. 
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bodies capable of exerting a given force must be precisely those that are subject to it; 
Newton emphasizes indeed that the interaction should be thought of as one single pro-
cess; and it effectively follows that there must be a parameter that simultaneously mea-
sures the strength of A as an exerter of this force and its susceptibility to the impression 
of this force by any other body B. We have, therefore, what may be called a metaphysics 
of stable--or static--fields of force, rigidly associated with particles.7 One point should perhaps 
be made in passing: namely, that on Newton’s conception of rigid atoms, there must be 
a law of a rather different kind that governs what happens in a collision of such 
atoms--precisely the kind of event that on the corpuscularian theory was seen as the 
mode of fundamental interaction. On Newton’s view, such collisions of atoms are ex-
tremely rare. The law governing them can be thought of as the characterization of one 
particular natural power, impenetrability; and Newton’s own opinion, late in his life, was 
that the law in question should be that of inelastic impact: from a collision of atoms there 
is no rebound: “Impenetrability,” he says, “only makes [bodies] stop” (Opticks, Bk. iii, 
Query 31; p. 398). 
VI 
 Now let us reflect upon the implications of this world-picture for our conception of 
causality. I think the usual view--the naive view--is that, in Newtonian physics, causes 
are just what Aristotle called efficient causes--causes or sources of motion; and that such, 
in Newtonian physics, are the motive forces. And, to be sure, it is interactions involving 
motive force that have replaced, in this physics, the impacts that were the causes in the 
corpuscularian view. But there are remarkable differences. For one thing, impressed 
motive forces do not precede the changes of motion associated with them. This, to be 
sure, is in accord with the doctrine of Aristotle, for whom the effect of an efficient cause 
is simultaneous with the action of the cause; but it is in sharp contrast with the standard 
Humean analysis of the relation of cause and effect. Furthermore, the force exerted by 
body A on body B is certainly not a distinguishable thing--event, action, what have 
you--identifiable in the world as a cause. According to the Newtonian law of gravita-
tion, my weight towards the earth is, fundamentally, not a single force exerted upon me 
by the earth; it is the resultant of the attractions exerted upon me8 by all the particles of 
which the earth is composed, taken severally--in very different directions and of very 
                                                 
7“Rigidly” because the law of “diffusion” to the places round about can depend on 
nothing but the distance of the place from the center A. 
8More accurately, upon each particle of my body 
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different magnitudes. But these elementary components are in no way discernible--it is 
only through the theory that the assertion of their presence and, in some sense, causality, 
finds any grounds at all. 
 I do not mean to argue, then, that the view that motive forces can be seen as effi-
cient causes is indefensible; only that it is not the primary notion of cause in the 
Newtonian scheme. There is another view, quite fashionable toward the end of the last 
and early in the present century, that considers modern physics to have been purged of 
any notion of cause at all; holding that this physics asserts only what were sometimes 
called “functional connections.” Well, the name by itself doesn’t matter; but what of the 
logos. In the reasoning by which Newton arrived at the law of gravitation, an essential 
step was his claim, on the basis of evidence, that the force that regulates the motion of the 
moon in its orbit is the very same force as that which we call “weight.” He did not of 
course mean that the impressed motive force on the moon is the same as that which 
causes a dropped object to fall; he meant that the causes of those two impressed 
forces--the natural power governing both processes--is the same. And what does that 
mean? The criterion is: that the same law is involved. But now this is not merely a ques-
tion of the assignment of a name: for Newton’s evidence showed, under his analysis, 
that the two processes are analogous in certain respects--that, to state the case a little 
schematically, the laws are in part “the same”; he thought the partial agreement was 
enough to warrant the inference that the two laws were in all ways “the same”; and this 
led to a quite novel conclusion: that the weight towards the earth of a terrestrial body 
would diminish if the body were lifted above the earth’s surface, and indeed would vary 
inversely as the square of the distance of the body from the earth’s center. For that there 
was no evidence before Newton’s argument; and Newton, as I have said, inferred it from 
his conclusion that the two forces--the two natural powers--are one and the same. 
 Another crucial step--the most momentous of all--in Newton’s path to the law of 
universal gravitation was his decision to treat the forces on, e.g., the moon and terres-
trial bodies, towards the earth; the planets, towards the sun; the satellites of Jupiter and 
Saturn, towards those planets; in each case as one side of an interaction with, in each 
case, the central body concerned; to treat the earth, for instance, as “attracted by” the sun, 
not “pushed towards” the sun by some hypothetical medium. This was in fact a very 
risky step; Newton had at the outset no evidence to support it. But his argument led 
with amazing swiftness to the conclusion that--if his supposition were true--there must 
be a universal force of attraction between any two particles of matter whatever; and (with the 
help of the detailed analysis of phenomena that had preceded) that this force must be 
proportional to the masses of the particles and inversely proportional to the square of 
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the distance between them. In other words, it led to a full statement of the law govern-
ing an “active force of nature”--the first of its kind (that is, the first fundamental, uni-
versal “active force”) ever discovered; and still, let me remind you, one among what 
physicists today refer to as the four--perhaps one can say three, or even (if a so-called 
Grand Unifying Theory is true) two--“fundamental forces.” It was, in turn, the 
successful application of this law to the principal phenomena of the solar system, 
showing that the gravitational interactions alone of the major bodies suffice to account 
for all their observed--“apparent”--motions, that allowed Newton to give what he called 
an “a priori proof of the Copernican system”: because (to a very close approximation) 
only interactions with one another are involved, the common center of mass of all the 
bodies of the solar system must be (to a very close approximation) without acceleration; 
and the sun is always close to that center of mass. 
 So I have been arguing that it is the notion of a natural power as characterized by a 
law of nature that is Newton’s truly most fundamental notion of a “cause”; not just by 
verbal formula, but by its role in substantive and very powerful reasoning. Now I want 
to report to you two encounters I have had with a philosopher of science of some repute 
over this notion. In the more recent exchange, he objected that this idea of a law of 
nature is simply too obscure to be of any value. To say that to Newton strikes me as a 
bit like telling a musician that the idea of a tune is obscure. In the earlier encounter, I 
had referred to Newton’s application of the third law of motion to the earth and sun, 
and had said that the test--the “proof,” in Newton’s language--of the correctness of that 
application was just the confirmation of all the empirical consequences of so applying it. 
The philosopher I am speaking of objected that that is just no good: the third law 
applies to bodies A and B when the force on B really is exerted by A; so the question has 
to be, not whether the consequences tally with observations, but “whether it really is 
the sun that’s doing it to the earth.” I was, frankly, dumfounded--speechless! How does 
he think that’s to be determined? What does he think it means? I believe--subject to a 
qualification to follow later--that Newton’s law of gravitation is true. I therefore believe 
that when I now wave my hand, the weights of all of you in this room change 
slightly--and the motion of Jupiter in its orbit is affected. But is my testimony of any 
value, if I tell you that “I am doing” that? I have to confess that I have no distinct 
consciousness whatever, either of an effort to achieve those effects, or of the success of 
any such effort. But on the other hand, does that mean I am not “doing it”? The claim I 
am really making is that in Newton’s scheme of the world, it is not the prior 
identification of the sun as “doing it” that warrants the application of the third 
law--because no such warrant is imaginable; rather, it is the successful application of the 
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third law--or, more fully, the subjection of the process, as one of a very large class of 
processes, to a general law of interaction--that allows us to say “who or what is doing it.” 
As to the ease, and the lack of special consciousness, with which I, with such virtuosity, 
modify the paths of the planets--it is just a special case of Maxwell’s remark: that the 
molecules and the planets simply move “like blessed gods.” 
 Another way of putting my central point about this matter is that the Newtonian 
forces of nature--and their successors, the “fundamental forces” of contemporary 
physics--are in effect most analogous to Aristotelian formal causes; and that the account 
of the world in modern physics, at least in the early modern physics of Newton, is 
rather like a highly sophisticated version of Aristotle’s “theology,” applied--and with 
amazing success--not just to the heavens, but everywhere. How can such causes be 
“efficacious”? Well, I do not know--nor, I suppose, do you--how the universe is what it 
is. I don’t even know (a point Newton makes, in a most interesting place) how I lift my 
arm (and thereby influence the planets). But I asked: Given the theater and the actors, 
what is the script?--and in the Newtonian universe, the forces of nature--the laws of na-
ture--are the script. One can hardly say more than that the “efficacity” of the script con-
sists in its being followed; I not only don’t know what “makes” it be so, I don’t have any 
idea what an answer to that question might possibly look like. I hope you won’t think it 
a little spooky if I say that this doesn’t seem so very different from the peculiar puzzle 
about how Aristotle’s first, unmoved, mover can “work”: how an eternal motion can oc-
cur “because” the heavenly bodies “imitate”--as an end--the activity of “thought think-
ing itself.” The difference lies not in our understanding how such causes work; it lies in 
the informativeness--and truth--of the statement that they work. 
VII 
 I said that a second qualification was needed of my characterization of what I have 
been discussing as the “Newtonian conception of the fundamental constitution of the 
world”--the first having been just the modernization of the space-time theory. You all 
know, of course, that the Newtonian picture is now--in fact, in several ways--outmoded. 
But there is good reason to think that Newton, if he were still with us--and despite his 
reputation for extreme jealousy (I mean this in its old sense--passionate possessiveness) 
of his intellectual property--would regard this situation with equanimity, indeed with 
great satisfaction. For whereas Newton was very strong in his assertion of the solid 
standing of his scientific theories--his theory of light and colors; his theory of universal 
gravitation--what he says about the general scheme of the laws of the natural powers is 
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that it is a program rather than a doctrine: he says, in the preface to the Principia, after 
describing his vision of philosophical investigation: “But I hope the principles here laid 
down will afford some light, either to that, or some truer, method of Philosophy.” 
 The first step in what was to be a real break with the Newtonian framework was 
taken between 1855 and 1864 by James Clerk Maxwell, in developing the fundamental 
theory of what we now regard as the second of the fundamental forces, that of electro-
magnetism.9 Maxwell himself had no thought of departing from the Newtonian 
framework, except in so far as he tried--and succeeded--in developing a theory of elec-
tromagnetic interactions as “nearby” interactions, rather than “actions at a distance.” It 
was one of the merits--an aspect of the versatility--of the Newtonian framework that it 
was perfectly capable of accommodating such interactions: the prototype or paradigm 
was the theory of continuous material media--solid (theory of elasticity) or fluid 
(Newton’s own theory of hydrodynamics and aerodynamics in general--of sound 
waves in particular). And it is a striking example of a kind of dialectical interplay of 
ideas that one of the ways in which the theory of elasticity was developed--especially at 
the hands of French theorists of the early nineteenth century--was with the help of 
models of such media as systems of discrete particles--interacting by short-range forces; 
i.e., at a distance, but only a very near (microscopic) distance. Such a medium, whether 
fundamentally continuous or molecular in structure, was, according to Maxwell’s 
hypothesis, responsible for electromagnetic phenomena. 
 But Maxwell had no decisive account of the detailed structure of the medium he 
postulated. Instead, he was led to take the electric and magnetic fields themselves as the 
“objects” of his theory. What does this mean? Whereas what I have described as fields 
in connection with Newton are representations of the actions exerted by bodies on other 
bodies, so that the laws of those fields are to be understood fundamentally as laws of the 
interaction of bodies, and the fields are (as I have said) rigidly associated with the bodies 
“whose fields they are,” Maxwell’s hypothesis was that the electric and magnetic fields 
are not rigidly associated with the bodies that exercise and undergo electric and mag-
netic forces; rather, the fields are functions of the fundamental state of an underlying 
medium--the field-vectors at any point functions of the state of the medium at that point, 
not of the arrangements of particles anywhere else. But all Maxwell knew about the 
supposed medium was what he knew about the fields themselves. What he succeeded 
                                                 
9Of course one had, by the end of the eighteenth century, Coulomb’s laws for 
electrostatic and magnetostatic interactions; but the discovery of electromagnetism 
showed that these could not be regarded as the fundamental and general laws of the 
subject. 
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in doing was finding laws (I DON’T KNOW ABOUT HIS MUSICAL PROWESS--NEWTON 
EVIDENTLY HAD NONE AT ALL; BUT IN PHYSICS, BOTH OF THEM WERE VERY GOOD AT 
FINDING THE TUNE) that relate the distributions of the fields in the immediate vicinity of any 
given point10 to the rates of change of the fields at that point (and also to the local densities 
of charge and current). Furthermore, on the mere supposition that there was an underly-
ing “mechanical” system (in the sense, of course, of Newtonian mechanics--not of the 
mechanical philosophy), of which the field magnitudes expressed something about the 
mechanical states, with the help of known relations of the field magnitudes to energy, 
Maxwell in part, and his successors with full success, were able to show that Maxwell’s 
laws of the field could be subsumed under, not (directly) Newton’s original mechanical 
principles (the three laws of motion), but mathematical transformations or generaliza-
tions of those that had long since been derived (essentially by Lagrange in the late eigh-
teenth century) as aids for the treatment of mechanical problems. In other words, 
Maxwell (to oversimplify here) succeeded in producing what he himself called “a dy-
namical theory of the electromagnetic field”--a theory in which the electromagnetic field 
itself was treated as a dynamical system--without describing the presumed underlying 
material dynamical system.11 
 By the early years of this century, it had become apparent that there could not be an 
underlying Newtonian mechanical system that supports the electromagnetic field. And 
this was a metaphysical revolution; it changed our conception of the actors in the the-
ater--and thus, necessarily, our conception of the form of the script as well. In fact the 
revolution was accompanied by a change in our conception of the theater: namely, by 
the advent of the special theory of relativity. But before I talk of this--that is, of Einstein-
Minkowski space-time--let me make a few remarks about what I have called the change 
in our conception of the actors (dare I say, of what is “real”? Yes, I dare!--following the 
example of Einstein, who called this change “Clerk Maxwell’s contribution to the con-
cept of physical reality”). 
                                                 
10More exactly, their spatial directional derivatives. 
11Of the Lagrangian generalized formulation of classical mechanics, Whitehead 
remarked: “The beauty and almost divine simplicity of these equations is such that 
these formulae are worthy to rank with those mysterious symbols which in ancient 
times were held directly to indicate the Supreme Reason at the base of all things.” 
(Science and the Modern World, pp. 62-63.) 
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VIII 
 There is a very strong tradition (which continues as a very strong tendency in con-
temporary philosophical thought)--a tradition that derives from ancient atomism and 
materialism--that takes something like “ordinary matter” to be the basic “real” 
constituents of the world. What one means by this is less clear than is often supposed; 
but in the semi-sophisticated context of popularized modern physics, this leads to the 
view that the real constituents are particles; that fields are fictitious entities, merely 
representing in convenient form the interactions of the particles. That is a view that may 
actually have some merit--physicists themselves do take it seriously, as one possible 
way to deal with some of the conceptual difficulties that exist in current theory; 
although a quite contrary view--that only fields are truly basic--is a very live competitor. 
At any rate, the view in question is completely untenable as a reading of the theory I am 
speaking of: the theory that emerged from Maxwell’s around the turn of the century. 
Here, according to that theory, is what is occurring in the theater of the world: The 
material points are as before; and between them there are (in Maxwell’s theory, before 
relativity) some forces of interaction--gravitation, at any rate--that have the Newtonian 
character: they depend upon the instantaneous relations of the particles. But besides the 
particles, there is throughout “space” at each moment the electromagnetic field, with its 
values at each point; and the “elements” of this field--a perhaps misleading term, since 
the field is distributed continuously--interact, only where they are in contact, both with one 
another, and with the particles. The consequence is that the space between the particles 
is full of an extraordinarily richly structured and eventful tissue of occurrences--in fact, 
the electromagnetic waves. But perhaps my description may seem hyperbolic; I suppose 
we all carry around--not, to be sure, at the forefront of consciousness!--an elementary 
picture of plane wave-fronts of sinusoidal vibrations marching staidly forward; and this 
doesn’t look so spectacularly rich. What, however, must we really take to be going on, 
in the electromagnetic field, for instance at a point in this room? Well, for one thing, 
according to Maxwell’s own great discovery, we have what Aristotle called “the 
actuality of the transparent qua transparent”: we have something that makes it possible 
for us all to see things--to see each other--through the air. At any given point of the room, 
the electric and magnetic field vectors are executing extremely complicated--I will not 
say vibrations, but dances. And these are so coordinated from point to point that the eyes 
and neural apparatus of each of us, affected on the retina by the dance being executed 
right there and, so to speak, analyzing those local dances, receive information about 
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whatever ordinary objects our eyes are turned towards. That such a process--of the 
simultaneous propagation, through every point in every direction, of information as complex 
as that we receive by sight--deserves to be called extraordinarily richly structured and 
eventful, will I hope be granted. 
 (In fact there is more. There is something all around us in this room that would not 
have been in a room, say, with Maxwell, when he was developing his theory. For the very 
same dance of electric and magnetic vectors that carries the information of sight to our 
eyes carries, at the same time and in the same place, whatever we can hear with the help 
of a radio that we bring into the room--on any AM or FM station--for instance, possibly, 
a fantasia of Orlando Gibbons, Berg’s Lulu, an account of the latest disasters in   [deleted: 
Bosnia and Israel/Palestine]   the world--I emphasize again: all these things. Moreover 
“we”--I speak impersonally: it isn’t actually true of me--know how to build a device, the 
radio I have referred to, that is able to respond selectively to one coherently chosen 
strain in what prima facie would seem a pandemonium: so that we can hear the Gibbons 
fantasia and be entirely oblivious of the rock and rap and talk that are being executed 
simultaneously in the dance.) 
 [I HAVE A QUALM: THAT I MAY SEEM IN THIS TO HAVE BEEN PEDDLING POPULAR 
SCIENCE UNDER THE GUISE OF PHILOSOPHY. BUT I THINK THAT A PHILOSOPHER WHO 
CLAIMS TO DISCUSS THE NATURE OF REALITY OUGHT TO HAVE SOME APPRECIATION OF 
WHAT IS REAL AND DETECTABLE ALL AROUND US--OUR KNOWLEDGE OF WHICH (AND IN 
PART ITS VERY EXISTENCE) IS OWED TO A NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE KIND LOCKE 
THOUGHT IN PRINCIPLE IMPOSSIBLE.] 
 Besides this change in the dramatis personæ, the transformed Maxwell theory en-
tails a drastic revision of our understanding of some of the fundamental concepts of clas-
sical, Newtonian physics. For not only do we now have a system, the electromagnetic 
field, that is not describable in terms of the motions of material points but still is subject 
to the “abstract” laws of Lagrangian dynamics, one is also led to ascribe to this system 
what may be called the “concrete” mechanical properties of momentum, angular momen-
tum, and energy, distributed continuously through space with densities that are de-
termined by the field magnitudes. Thus, for instance, the fundamental principle of the 
conservation of what Newton called the quantity of motion is no longer a consequence 
of the third law of motion (since this is not applicable to interactions of charge and field, 
or of the field with itself), and no longer concerns the quantity of motion as Newton de-
fined it (product of mass by velocity); instead it concerns a quantity of which Newton’s 
definition characterizes one subspecies, but of which another subspecies is a certain 
function of the electric and magnetic field-intensity vectors. 
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 I have here emphasized that this is a revision of our understanding of these concepts. 
On the one hand, I do not think that there is any profit in asking such a question as 
whether Newton’s use singled out a certain “natural kind” as the “reference” of his term 
“quantity of motion,” and, if so, whether that natural kind includes the electromagnetic 
momentum. On the other hand, I would repudiate in the strongest terms the suggestion 
that we are here dealing with a mere “convention,” or even an evasion performed in or-
der to hide the fact that “the laws of physics lie.” I think Plato was quite right: it’s not 
the nouns and verbs alone that do the job; we have to know how to think with and 
about them. There is here a real conceptual change; but one sees--shall I say, grasps by 
mo’|—that the revised conservation law is as it were the legitimate successor to the 
original. 
IX 
 It is worth turning back for a moment to the question of the notion of causation in 
the Newtonian framework; for I have not yet mentioned one important aspect of that. I 
have emphasized that fundamental interaction is simultaneous in that setting, not “an 
antecedent determining a consequent”; it should be noted, too, that such interaction is 
continual, and is conceived generally speaking as of unrestricted spatial scope. 
Nevertheless, there is an important way in which one can introduce a notion of some-
thing like “lines of causal influence” in a Newtonian system: namely, one can consider 
an entire process within this framework, and then ask if a certain change were intro-
duced--conceptually, as a thought-experiment--at a certain moment, how would the new 
entire process differ from the old? (It is after all in this sense that I could say earlier that 
my wave of the arm “influenced” the motions of the planets: had I not waved my arm, 
the motions--according to the theory--would have been very slightly different.) When 
this kind of consideration is applied to the processes in an elastic medium, one is led to 
the notion of “propagation of effects” in such a medium “with finite speed”--e.g., to the 
notion of sound waves (in ordinary media) or light waves (in the hypothetical 
“luminiferous ether”--or the “electromagnetic ether” of Maxwell). 
 This propagation with finite velocity, in the context of an underlying Newtonian 
dynamical system, is not a “fundamental” process, but an artifact of instantaneous inter-
action within systems of a particular sort. But when the material support of Maxwell’s 
field has been abandoned, while the architecture of the Newtonian “theater” remains, 
one has to conceive of two quite different modes of fundamental interaction: the instanta-
neous interactions between particles, and the propagation of field effects with finite ve-
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locity. But velocity relative to what? Our version of the Newtonian theater has no such 
concept as velocity! 
 The issue implied by that question was wrestled with during the closing years of 
the preceding century. A strong--but curiously ambivalent--voice in the discussion of 
the problem was that of Henri Poincaré, who insisted on the one hand (to very 
constructive effect) that makeshift solutions to the issue would not do, that a rigorous 
theory was required; and insisted at the same time that the issues of space and time 
involved in the question “relative to what?” are matters of pure convention, not at all of 
the “real” structure of the world. The resolution we owe, of course, to Einstein, who 
changed our conception of the theater. So we come to a third picture:    [DRAW 
DIAGRAM]      Point (1) of our previous version remains: there is still an affine structure 
on space-time, which essentially determines--as it did in the Newtonian version--a 
distinction between “uniform” and “non-uniform” motion (straight vs. curved world-
lines); but in the place of (2) and (3)--the time-interval function, and the spatial distance 
at a moment--we have, as Minkowski taught us to recognize, a new kind of “quasi-
metric” on the four-dimensional vector-space V, which separates space-time directions 
into those that are “time-like,” those that are “space-like,” and--the boundary between 
those--directions “along the light-cone,” which are the loci of the propagation of influence 
in the electromagnetic field. (Time-like vectors have, then, “time-like length”; space-like 
vectors have “space-like length”; and vectors along the light cone have “zero 
length”--hence are called “null vectors.”) In this theater, material points are represented 
as before, by world-lines whose tangent-vectors are everywhere time-like--which now, 
however, means: everywhere directed into the forward lobe of the light-cone; so that their 
possible velocity-differences have a finite upper bound, the velocity of light. 
 A point of central importance about this changed architecture is that particle inter-
actions of the Newtonian type are not even conceivable in the new framework: there is 
simply no such thing as a “moment,” and therefore no such thing as an “instantaneous 
situation” or “configuration” of particles; nothing in the space-time geometry that can 
allow one to describe an “instantaneous direct interaction” between particles, satisfying 
Newton’s third Law of Motion. The state of affairs is perfectly adapted to the already 
existing theory of electromagnetic interaction--which, of course, is the theory that led to 
this transformation of the space-time framework to begin with. There, the field laws of 
Maxwell, in the form into which they were put by H. A. Lorentz, already determine in-
ternal interaction within the field at each point in such a way that effects are propa-
gated--strictly speaking, everywhere--along the light-cone; and it turned out that the law 
stated by Lorentz for the force exerted by the field upon a charged particle has a unique 
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“natural” expression within the new framework (this was first pointed out by Planck). 
In this formulation, the analogue of the Newtonian “motive force” is a space-time 
vector  perpendicular, in the sense of Minkowski’s geometry, to the world-line of the 
particle: it represents the time rate of change, with respect to what is called the proper 
time of the particle, of the unit tangent-vector to that particle’s world-line. Influence is 
still propagated in two ways: namely, through the field, along the light-cones; and by 
the motion of the particles, within the light-cones; but neither involves direct interaction 
of particles; and, in this theory, for both, the velocity of light is an upper limit to the 
speed of transmission. 
X 
 The theory we are now considering has remarkable consequences in point of ex-
plaining, and correcting, some of what philosophers often rather glibly to speak of as 
“our intuitions,” and the “conceptual necessities” that are sometimes based on them. 
  For example, returning to our case of merely mild foolishness by Descartes, one 
conclusion he drew from his analysis of natural power was that the action of a body on 
the plenary medium surrounding it has to be propagated instantaneously; if I push one 
end of a stick, he says, it is clearly and distinctly evident that the other end must move 
at the very same time. Now this is actually correct for such a medium as Descartes en-
visaged: influence in an incompressible medium is indeed propagated instantaneously, 
for just the reason Descartes gives (that unless all parts of an extended region of the 
medium move simultaneously, no part will have a place it can move into).12   Such a 
medium, and the associated process of instantaneous propagation, is, if not as Descartes 
thought necessary, at any rate conceivable. But one has to be careful about these modal 
words: such a process, and therefore such a medium, is not possible--is not conceiv-
able--within the space-time framework of special relativity. 
 Let us consider this problem in a wider perspective: let us first imagine pushing a 
stick in the Newtonian theater. Here the possibilities stand open. It is possible to con-
sider the stick as rigid--as Newton supposed his fundamental particles to be. In that 
case, the length of the stick is an intrinsic and unalterable property; from which it fol-
lows that if one end moves, all the rest of the stick (with the possible exception of one 
                                                 
12To be quite accurate: a finite velocity of propagation of effects is possible in a 
medium of fixed density; but only if the medium has elastic resistance to shear (or 
torsion)--not in such a medium as was envisaged by Descartes, where the only mode of 
communication of motion is by pressure. 
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line of points that might serve as an axis of rotation) must move at the very same time. 
On the other hand, it was known--on subtle but good evidence--to such far-sighted sev-
enteenth-century investigators as Huygens and Newton, that “ordinary” bodies simply 
are not rigid, but elastic. One may conceive of an elastic solid body as comprising a sys-
tem of Newtonian particles, in a configuration of stable equilibrium under the forces they 
exert upon one another: that is, in such a configuration that (a) the net motive force 
upon each particle is zero, and (b) any slight change of the relative distances within the 
system will give rise to forces--and for elasticity that approximates rigidity, one should 
say: very strong forces--that act in such directions as tend to restore the relative dis-
tances to their previous values. In any system of this kind, a small local change from the 
equilibrium configuration will give rise to a change propagated with finite velocity: the 
velocity of elastic waves--alias sound waves--in that system. If I push against one end of 
a stick, supposing it to be a system of this kind, what happens is that an elastic ripple 
travels through it, at the rate of transmission of sound in the material it is made of; and 
no part of the stick begins to move, or is affected in any way by the initiating push, until 
that ripple reaches it. 
 A second aspect of this kind of interaction--the very paradigm of our “experience of 
efficient causation,” of “what is really doing it,” in the bodily realm--also arises already 
in the Newtonian context. I have mentioned that Newton considered collisions of ulti-
mate particles to be extremely rare. But then, what does happen when I press my hand 
against a stick and push? Another opinion of Newton’s--for which, again, he had subtle 
but good evidence--was that ordinary “hard” bodies do not generally come into actual 
contact with one another (that is, their respective particles do not do so); that they are, 
rather, kept from actual contact by extremely powerful repelling forces. So, again, what 
happens when I push the stick, like the process within the stick to which that initial push 
gives rise, is conceived to be something quite different from what it seems: the complex 
effect of the behavior of a large number of particles, none in contact, governed by 
Newtonian laws of interaction. And what I feel when my hand presses the stick is the ef-
fect of motions communicated to particles within my hand by the same process, and transmit-
ted through the nerves to the brain: it is this communication of motion through re-
pelling forces that constitutes the very nature of what we call the “contact” that we per-
ceive. 
 But now, when we view the same physical process from the perspective of the spe-
cial theory of relativity, we are led to the view that this communication of influence, at 
the very most fundamental level, is never between particles directly at all--whether 
particles in contact, or particles interacting at a distance; that, indeed, all “efficacy” of 
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bodies upon one another--including, to repeat, their “efficacy” upon our organs of per-
ception--is mediated by fields (having their own independent existence--as it were, as 
“substantial” beings, without corporeal “support”), and, at the fundamental level, 
propagated with the speed of light. We have arrived at the veritable Hegelian antithesis 
of Locke’s view that impulse--that is, impact--is the only way bodies act because the only 
way we can conceive bodies to act; but the confirmation of his other view, that how bodies 
act on one another--even if it is in some sense “by impulse”--is something of which we 
are no more endowed with a clear “fundamental” grasp than how bodies interact with 
minds. 
XI 
 “And now my story’s begun!”--certainly not done; but I have to bring it to a stop. 
One more thing I cannot refrain from mentioning. It might be asked: Given that both 
my moving of bodies and my perceiving them (allegedly) “has to be” mediated by 
fields, do we have any idea by what fields this is accomplished? The answer is that we 
do--but only thanks to yet another transformation of the most fundamental concepts of 
“first philosophy”--the most drastic to date. Within the framework of classical physics, 
and of the “revolutionized” physics of the early twentieth century (the special and gen-
eral theories of relativity), the question, which Newton had envisaged as crucial to natu-
ral philosophy, What are the forces that produce the cohesion of bodies, and the phenomena of 
chemical interaction?, had remained not only unanswered, but without a clue to an an-
swer: no “forces of nature,” no laws of force, had ever been found that could have such 
effects. But the development of quantum mechanics completely changed that situation, 
and we can claim today to know that the phenomena in question--and thus all the prop-
erties of the “matter” with which we are familiar--result from just the electromagnetic in-
teraction; indeed, to a preponderant degree, from mere electrostatic forces. So once again, 
a most crucial role is played, in our understanding as well as in our control of the 
world, by the form of the script: our most elementary experiences of causal efficacy 
require for their explanation that strangest of Platonic forms to emerge in the 
development of physics, the conceptual framework of quantum mechanics--and this 
form has made it possible for the mere electrostatic law of Coulomb, which in the 
context of classical physics is incapable of producing any stable equilibrium, to account 
both for the stability and the change characteristic of physico-chemical structures and 
systems. 
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 But the story, as I have said, is not done; nor would it be if I were able to bring it 
entirely up to date. We are advised from time to time that physics is about to come to an 
end; and I should not wish to declare positively that such a thing will never happen. 
The impossibility of secure and final knowledge is not something that a mitigated un-
remitting skeptic such as I should take as certain (as J. B. Cabell wrote--I presume fol-
lowing Arcesilaus--“to hold that we know nothing assuredly, and never can know 
anything assuredly, is to take too much on faith”). But we have not reached that final 
point, and there is reason to believe that we may be in, still, for changes in our most fun-
damental notions that equal or exceed in magnitude those I have described here. 
Moreover, in any case, there is no reason to believe that the importance of continued re-
flection on the position attained in knowledge will itself terminate. I began with commendb 
on a series of quotations; let me end with a comment on two more. Aristotle tells us 
(Posterior Analytics I 9) that it is hard to know whether one knows, and (Metaphysics I 2, 
982b12, 983a12-21) that philosophy begins in wonder, but ends in the contrary state. Plato 
never wrote the hinted-at sequel to the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, to have been 
called the Philosopher. I have long cherished the fantasy, anachronistic though it be, that 
in that work Socrates, questioning Aristotle, would have led him to admit that it is im-
possible to know whether one knows, and that if wisdom is the contrary state to won-
der, then philosophy never ends. 
